Questions of Accountability: The Post-War Transition of Iraq

“But I, being poor, have only my dreams;

I have spread my dreams under your feet; 

Tread softly because you tread on my dreams.” 

- W. B. Yeats [1]

On March 20, 2003, the United States led a multinational coalition of the willing into Iraq, intent on overthrowing Saddam Hussein and establishing a democratic government in Iraq. Four countries participated with troops during the Major Combat Operations phase: the United States (241,516), United Kingdom (41,000), Australia (2,000), and Poland (200) [2]. The initial rush proved to be highly successful in overwhelming the Iraqi forces; two days into the war, General Tommy Franks reported that the lead column of the Marines 3rd infantry Division was 100 miles out of Baghdad, and that “thousands [of Iraqi soldiers] are just taking off their uniforms and going home.” [3]. Thirty-eight days later, the Iraqi government had collapsed.

Bob Woodward , assistant editor of the Washington Post, observes “April 09, was the symbolic end of Saddam‘s rule” as U.S. Marines occupied downtown Baghdad and “helped a group of Iraqis topple a 20-foot statue of Saddam.” [4]. The population seemed to greet U.S. troops as liberators -- thousands of Iraqi’s took to the streets of Baghdad to rejoice. Three weeks later, on May 01, 2003, President George W. Bush addressed the nation from the flight deck of the USS Abraham Lincoln, proclaiming that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.” [5]. While the President was careful to warn of the “difficult work” ahead in Iraq, the general tone of the speech indicated that that the war was over and the U.S. had emerged victorious.

The President’s speech seems to have been premature. The power vacuum created by the removal of the Baath regime, and the subsequent lack of civil authority which followed, have culminated to effect the total breakdown of Iraqi society. Five years after the President’s proclamation, U.S troops are still engaged in daily combat missions in an attempt to quell the violence and restore order in Iraq. The post-war problems in Iraq have led many to criticize the Bush Administration for its lack of foresight and preparation. Critics, such as former Secretary of State Colin Powell, fault the administration for focusing too much on the war effort and not enough on the aftermath. This has led to calls for accountability from the American public, resulting in the resignation of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the architect of the Iraqi war.

The object of this paper is to evaluate whether the current conditions in Iraq could have been foreseen and prevented by effective U.S. policy. In doing so, I will review some of the relevant literature to determine what constitutes a foreign policy mistake. Next, I will discuss some of the important policy decisions leading up to the Iraq war, and their post-war effect. Finally, I will evaluate U.S. policy decisions through the filter of several cognitive psychological theories to determine what, if any, diagnostic and prescriptive errors may have occurred.

What Constitutes a Policy Mistake? 

In everyday usage, a mistake usually refers to a faulty analytical process which leads an incorrect conclusion. In political terms, a policy mistake is simply a cognitive misdiagnosis of the available information, which may, or may not lead to erroneous action in effecting a solution. The two leading schools of thought in evaluating foreign policy mistakes are Rational Choice Theory and Cognitive Psychology.

The premise of Rational Choice Theory is that all political actors should act rationally. It operates under the economic model of cost benefit analysis:

An action is rational to the extent that it is 'correctly' designed to maximize goal achievement … Given more than one goal (the usual human condition), an act is rational to the extent that it is correctly designed to maximize net goal achievement … An action is correctly designed to maximize goal satisfaction to the extent that it is efficient, or in other words to the extent that goal satisfaction exceeds goal cost." [6].

The optimal outcome of rational choice is to obtain maximum benefit for minimum cost. A mistake, or suboptimal outcome, is the result of an incorrect analysis or application of all the available information, resulting in an irrational (inefficient) choice being made. There are several questionable assumptions built into the theory: (1) it presupposes that a holistic gathering of all the relevant information occurs; (2) that it is cognitively possible for human beings to process the broad range of incoming information and correctly assess the full spectrum of alternatives; and (3) that decisions are not influenced by any pre-existing cognitive patterns or environmental conditions. [7].
Political psychologists contend that foreign policy decisions rarely conform to this ideal model of calculated problem-solving. In “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” Alexander George contends that:

… efforts at rational decision-making in political life are subject to constraints of the following kind: (1) The political actor’s information about situations with which he must deal is usually incomplete; (2) His knowledge of ends-means relationships is generally inadequate to predict reliably the consequences of choosing one or another course of action; and (3) it is often difficult for him to formulate a single criterion by means of which to choose which alternative course of action is best. [8].

Walker and Malici, affirm that choices are “often far from optimal” and generally “cannot be understood by the deductive logic of rational choice approaches.” They argue that “a linear model of information processing and choice fails because it misses a host of agential and structural contingencies that occur during the decision-making process.” As a result, Rational Choice theorists are criticized for ignoring the importance of the mental processes by which individuals, groups, and organizations come to make a decision.

Walker and Malici, however, seem to recognize the value of reconciling the two competing disciplines. They identify with the Rational Choice position in their assertion “that mistakes are conceptualized as: (1) a faulty diagnosis of a situation, or (2) a faulty prescription regarding that situation, or (3) both faulty diagnosis and prescription.” They qualify this by identifying two types of diagnostic and prescriptive mistakes that can occur -- errors of omission and errors of commission. [9]. An error of omission can occur when a leader fails to recognize (detect) a threat or opportunity, and so responds too late (hesitation). Conversely, an error of commission occurs when a leader misperceives an opportunity or threat, and reacts preemptively. [10].

Intelligence and policy mistakes most often share a causal relationship; policy mistakes result from intelligence mistakes. Prescriptive measures are usually determined by one’s diagnosis of the political environment. However, the one does not necessarily flow from the other:

It is possible for a policy to realize its goals and still be a mistake, because of the costs of success. It may also be the case that a policy will not achieve its goals through no fault of the decision maker, because of the efforts of others to thwart their achievement. Conversely, a policy may achieve its goals because of the mistakes of others rather than one’s own efforts and skill. [11].

Nor are mistakes always the result of an individual actor. Psychologists have long been aware of the tendency of groups to gravitate towards a shared ideology; a pathological phenomenon known as groupthink, which tends to polarize a collective’s mindset and close them off from external influence. This can also occur at an organizational level. In Blindsided, Parker and Stern advocate the Bureaucratic Politics Approach to understanding political decisions, which views “policy outcomes as the end result of competing bureaucratic interests and preferences.” [12].

I will argue that all of these factors had an impact on the pre-war planning for the invasion. The post-war difficulties in securing Iraq were not the result of a single erroneous policy, but the culmination of several prescriptive mistakes which originated with the misdiagnosis of the problems we would face in the occupation phase of the war.

Pre-War Planning

The two competing philosophies in the pre-war planning strategy were offered by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State, Colin Powell. Rumsfeld took a hard-line approach of transforming the armed forces into a smaller, more efficient fighting force, that was capable of quick deployment in crisis regions. [13]. The Rumsfeld plan relied heavily on technology and intelligence, envisioning a campaign of precision bombing in concert with a heavy, sustained attack by ground troops. Later referred to as “shock and awe,” the goal was to devastate the enemy through “overwhelming mass and simultaneity of forces,” a strategy which had “proven successful” in Afghanistan. [14]. Woodward reports that Rumsfeld believed “such a massive blow might create unbearable pressure and break the regime in the early period of the war.” [15]. Rumsfeld’s ideal troop size was about 75,000. [16].

Conversely, the “Powell Doctrine” called for the use overwhelming force; massive numbers of “boots on the ground” to invade and secure the occupied territory. This strategy had proven successful in limiting U.S. causalities during the first Gulf War. [17]. The military agreed. The existing war plans for Iraq called for the slow build-up of some 500,000 troops [18] over a seven month period. Fallows reports:

The Military’s fundamental argument for building up what Rumsfeld considered a wastefully large force is that it would be even more useful after Baghdad fell than during actual combat. The first few days or weeks after the fighting, in this view, were crucial in setting long-term expectations. Civilians would see that they could expect a rapid return to order, and they would behave accordingly -- or they would see the opposite. [19].

Thomas White, the secretary of the Army during the war, agreed: “For five million Bosnians [during the war in Kosovo] we had two hundred thousand people to watch over them. Now we have 25 million Iraqi’s to worry about … How many people is that going to take?” [20].

General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, felt that this “was the kind of plodding, tank-heavy, big bomb massing of military might from another era. Just the thing that drove Rumsfeld nuts.” [21]. The question became which would be more difficult, winning the war or occupying Iraq? Rumsfeld’s staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) took the position that winning the war took precedence:

The OSD acted as if the war itself would pose the real challenge. As [General] White put it, ‘The planning assumptions were that the people would realize they were liberated, they would be happy that we were there, so it would take a much smaller force to secure the peace than it did to win the war. The resistance would principally be the remnants of the Baath Party, but they would go away fairly rapidly. And critically, if we didn’t damage the infrastructure in our military operation, as we didn’t, the restart of the country could be done fairly rapidly. [22].

It can be argued, that the OSD fell susceptible to what Parker and Stern describe as wishful thinking; a pathological defense mechanism which eases anxiety, at the cost of “increasing vulnerability” through “motivated self-deception.” [23]. In addition, they point out that “individual tendencies toward psychological avoidance can, under certain circumstances, be amplified by the characteristics of the group setting in which much of the work of government takes place.” [24].

The State Department and the Military vehemently disagreed with OSD‘s position, arguing that revenge killings, looting, and civil disorder were all foreseeable possibilities that needed to be accounted for. In October of 2001, seventeenth months prior to the start of the invasion, the State Department had formed the future of Iraq program to investigate and plan for the problems that the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq would pose. [25]. The committee was composed of teams of Iraqi exiles and international advisors who were responsible for attending numerous seminars and drafting sessions to address the Iraq issue. [26]. According to Fallow “one recurring theme in the exercises was the risk of civil disorder after the fall of Baghdad.” [27]. Everyone was concerned that a failure to secure order and get the bureaucracy functioning quickly would be problematic. Rend Rahim Francke, an Iraqi exile participating in the project, warned:

The system of public security will break down, because there will be no functioning police force, no civil service and no justice system … There will be a vacuum of political authority and administrative authority. The infrastructure of vital sectors will have to be restored. An adequate police force must be trained and equipped as quickly as possible. And the economy will have to be jump-started not only from stagnation but devastation. [28].

The State Department realized that the failure to quickly secure these objectives would only prolong the occupation, further alienating the Iraqi population.

As tensions grew between the OSD and the State Department/Military coalition, each organization began to close themselves off to the views of the other, leading to a groupthink pathology within each department. Both the OSD and the State Department had become closed groups, each staunch in their own viewpoints on how the war should be executed. What resulted was a power struggle between the departments, further complicating objective decision-making. As Parker and Stern note that this kind of “bureaucratic conflict” can strengthen this type of closed-mindedness and create “pathologies that lead to policy failure”:

Social psychological research has suggested that “social categorization,” which is the human tendency to make “us”- versus - “them” distinctions, and “cognitive categorization,” in which one group stereotypes and accentuates the perceived differences of other agencies, tend to exacerbate intergroup conflict and hinder performance in situations where “groups must cooperate to achieve larger goals. [29].

In “Groupthink or Deadlock,” Paul A. Cowert points out the danger this poses: “leaders in closed groups will not receive the information they need … will consider fewer options than they should, and will base their decisions on a distorted and incomplete understanding of the problems they face. [30].

The bureaucratic rivalry between the OSD and the State Department had major repercussions on the administration’s post-war success in Iraq. The information gathering process needed to make smart, logical decisions came to a halt when the OSD refused to address problems related to the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq, perceiving any discussion of post-war issues as being counterproductive to reducing troop sizes. The OSD eventually the “Hybrid Plan;” a compromise between the initial vision of Powell, and that of Rumsfeld which called for the deployment of 250,000 troops prior to the occupation of Iraq.” [31]. With allied support, the size of the invasion force had grown to 288,200 troops during the major combat operations phase of the war. A strategic plan was never fully developed to account for how the smaller force would successfully secure post-war Iraq.

Post-War Problems

On April 09, 2003, the U.S. Marines occupied Baghdad, effectively marking the end of the reign of Saddam Hussein and the Baath regime. As thousands of Iraqis celebrated in the streets of Baghdad, it seemed that the OSD had been correct -- U.S. troops would be greeted as liberators. As Woodward puts it, “It seemed to be the sweets and flowers that some predicted.” [32]. The atmosphere quickly changed. An error of omission occurred as U.S. troops, awaiting orders on how to proceed, failed to quickly secure vital infrastructure and reestablish civil order. Fallows quotes Peter Galbraith, a former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, as saying:

When the United States entered Baghdad on April 9, it entered a city largely undamaged by a carefully executed military campaign … However, in the three weeks following the U.S. takeover, unchecked looting effectively gutted every important public institution in the city -- with the notable exception of the oil ministry. [33].

The failure to stop the looting destroyed the vital infrastructure that the military had predicted would be essential to quickly reestablishing administrative authority and regaining control of the city. As an American citizen in Baghdad at the time aptly noted: “People are used to someone being in charge, and when they realize no one is, the fabric rips.” [34].

The problem was exacerbated by the decision of Paul Bremer, the Director of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, to 1.) to disband the Iraqi military; and, 2.) to refuse to allow former members of the Baath regime to participate in the new government. There were two rationales for making this move; 1.) with mass defections, the Iraqi army had essentially “disbanded itself;” and, 2.) Allowing them to participate in the new government would send the wrong message to those who had been oppressed by the former regime. [35]. Fallows sees this as a “catastrophic error of commission:”

Studies from the Army War College, the Future of Iraq project, and the Center for Strategic and International studies … had all considered exactly this problem and suggested ways of removing the noxious leadership while retaining the ordinary troops. They had all warned against disbanding the Iraqi Army. The Army War College , for example, said in its report , “To tear apart the Army in the war’s aftermath could lead to the destruction of one of the only forces of unity within the society. [36].

The lack of perceived authority created the “power vacuum” that Francke [37] had predicted and the country devolved into a hotbed of tribal warfare, revenge killings, and terrorist activity.

The lack of administrative authority has also had a devastating effect on reconstruction efforts. According to former National Security Council advisor, Richard A. Clarke: “In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, one had to join the Baath Party to gain promotion to the managerial positions throughout the economy. By dismissing the all … there were suddenly no experienced managers.” [38]. Quite the conundrum when you are trying to rebuild a country. As a result, reconstruction efforts have been plagued by poor management, mishandling of reconstruction funds, and inadequate coordination. In addition, reconstruction efforts have been hindered by widespread attacks on construction sites. It is estimated that 25% of reconstruction funds have been used to provide security to construction workers and job sites. Armed conflict, murder, kidnapping, vandalism, and sabotage are routine threats to reconstruction contractors. According to the October 2007 report of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR), 1073 workers on U.S. funded projects have died, including 235 civilians, since reconstruction began in March 2003. [39].

Conclusion(s)

The post-war difficulties in securing Iraq originated with the OSD’s misdiagnosis of the problems we would face in the occupation phase of the war. I believe that a combination of pathological factors contributed to the lack of adequate preparation. First, it can be fairly argued that Rumsfeld and his staff engaged in wishful thinking. I do not believe that the OSD rationally considered the threat of such a catastrophic breakdown in civil order; no one intentionally walks into a quagmire. The OSD seems to have been blinded by self- deception. Believing that American troops would be greeted as liberators, they overestimated the Iraqi’s willingness to cooperate with military authorities in effectively policing themselves. This self-deception seems to have developed within a small closed group of officials, encouraging a groupthink which spread to an organizational level in the OSD.

The same phenomenon seems to have occurred within the State Department and the Military. Several key officials who were critical of the risks of downsizing troops during the occupational phase rallied together, forming a closed group vehemently opposed to the war planning of the OSD. The bureaucratic conflict that ensued, resulted in an “us” - versus - “them” mentality which only served to reinforce each departments prejudices. The power struggle that occurred between the State Department and the OSD, hindered effective policy by inhibiting coordinated efforts to come up with a workable solution for post-war security.

While troop size has definitely played a role in the failure to secure vital infrastructure, the ad-hoc decision-making which resulted from a poorly formulated contingency plan has arguably caused the most damage in post-war Iraq. This is a failure that could have been avoided by an increased willingness to compromise on the side of both departments. Even if it wasn’t needed, the OSD should have seen the value in having an intelligible blueprint for the post-war occupation of Iraq. Likewise, by inextricably intertwining post-war contingencies to larger troop sizes, the State Department closed the door on an opportunity to convince the OSD to adopt an adapted post-war procedure to complement the smaller invasion force.

The most traumatic effect of our failure to adopt an adequate post-war policy is the current humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Iraq Body Count, an organization which tracks civilian deaths from violence reported through the media, estimates the civilian death toll to range between 84,150 and 91,713 documented deaths as of May 21, 2008. [40]. In addition, a report issued by the International Rescue Committee’s Commission on Iraqi Refugees in March 18, 2008, estimates that over 4 million Iraqi’s have been displaced by the violence. [41].

Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn Rule” that “If you break it, you buy it” has turned out to be prophetic; we now own the “the hopes, aspirations, and problems” of 25 million Iraqi citizens. [42]. My hope is that we accept this responsibility. We should remain committed to the Iraqi people by moving beyond our initial mistakes, and continuing to provide the necessary military and financial support required to reestablish civil and economic stability. Despite the unpopularity of the war, we can only compound our mistakes by forcing Iraq to solve these problems on its own.

By Lawrence Christopher Skufca (2008)

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[2] Woodward, Robert. 2004. Plan Of Attack. (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster); 401.
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[11] Ibid.; 5.
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[19] Fallows, James. 2004. “Blind Into Baghdad.” (Internet: theAtlantic.com). 11. Stable URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200401/fallows. (accessed 5/10/08).
[20] Ibid.; 12.
[21] Woodward, Robert. 2004. Plan Of Attack. (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster); 37.
[22] Fallows, James. 2004. “Blind Into Baghdad.” (Internet: theAtlantic.com). 12. Stable URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200401/fallows. (accessed 5/10/08).
[23] Parker, Charles F. and Eric K. Stern. 2002. “Blindsided? September 11th and the Origins of Strategic Surprise.” International Society of Political Psychology. (Malden, Ma: Blackwell Publishing, Inc.); 607-8.
[24] Ibid.; 608.
[25] Kirk, Michael. 2004. Rumsfeld’s War. PBS Frontline. DVD, Director: Michael Kirk. (Arlington, VA: PBS Foundation).
[26] Fallows, James. 2004. “Blind Into Baghdad.” (Internet: theAtlantic.com). 4. Stable URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200401/fallows. (accessed 5/10/08).
[27] Ibid.; 6.
[28] Ibid.; 7.
[29] Parker, Charles F. and Eric K. Stern. 2002. “Blindsided? September 11th and tha Origins of Strategic Surprise.” International Society of Political Psychology. (Malden, Ma: Blackwell Publishing, Inc.); 612-13.
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[31] Woodward, Robert. 2004. Plan Of Attack. (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster); 121.
[32] Ibid.; 409.
[33] Fallows, James. 2004. “Blind Into Baghdad.” (Internet: theAtlantic.com). 20-21. Stable URL: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/200401/fallows. (accessed 5/10/08).
[34] Ibid.; 20.
[35] Ibid.; 20.
[36] Ibid.; 20.
[37] Ibid.; 7.
[38] Clarke, Richard A. 2006. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War On Terror. (New York, NY: Free Press); 272.
[39] Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR). 2007. “Update on Iraq Reconstruction.” (Internet: www.sigir.mil); Stable URL:http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Oct07/pdf/Section2_-_October_2007.pdf. (accessed 05/17/08).
[40] Iraq Body Count. “Documented Civilian Deaths from Violence.” (Internet: iraqbodycount.org) Stable URL: http://www.iraqbodycount.org/ (accessed 05/21/08).
[41] IRC Commission on Iraqi Refugees. 2008. “Five Years Later, A Hidden Crisis.” (Internet: the irc.org) Stable URL: http://www.theirc.org/resources/2008/iraq_report.pdf. (accessed 05/21/08).
[42] Woodward, Robert. 2004. Plan Of Attack. (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster); 150.